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PERSONAL PROPERTY AND SALES-1958 TENNESSEE SURVEY
CLAUDE E. BANKESTER*

PERSONAL PROPERTY
Gifts: Two cases included in this survey, both being opinions by the
court of appeals of the western section, concern the validity of an
inter vivos gift made when there was a confidential relationship existing between the donor and donee. In Nicholas v. Wright,' the
donor's husband died in 1912, leaving her a considerable amount of
farm land. Mrs. Wright, the donor, being a very astute business
woman, successfully managed the land and by 1947, the year in which
she began making the gifts in question, had accumulated approximately $250,000 in cash and bonds. At her death in 1953, at the age of
ninety-three, she owned several thousand acres of valuable farm land.
The donee, Mrs. Nicholas, was the favorite niece of Wright. Nicholas
came with her mother to live with Wright soon after the death of the
latter's husband in 1912, when Nicholas was only seven years old.
After the death of her mother in 1933, Nicholas continued to live
with Wright. By this time Nicholas had become well acquainted with
the operation and management of Wright's business. In 1944, Wright's
health began to fail, and she began to lean heavily upon Nicholas for
assistance in the management of her property. In that year Nicholas
began keeping the books, and in 1947, began writing checks for Wright.
The gifts in question were made between 1947 and 1951, and totaled

$136,150.
In 1953, Wright was adjudged mentally incompetent and Nicholas
was appointed guardian. After the death of Wright, Nicholas filed a
petition for final settlement as guardian, and the appellants, another
niece and nephew of Wright, filed exceptions thereto, the basis for the
exceptions being that the gifts were void because made when Nicholas
occupied a confidential relationship with Wright. By her will, Wright
left most of her property to the appellee and appellants in this case,
Nicholas receiving the greater portion.
The existence of a confidential or fiduciary relationship between two2
parties does not prevent either party from making a gift to the other.
However, when the gift is from the dependent party to the dominant
party of the relationship, there arises a presumption that the gift was
obtained by the exercise of undue influence on the donor and there* Professor of Law, Cumberland University. Member, Alabama Bar.
1. 301 S.W.2d 540 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
2. Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn. App. 439, 145 S.W.2d 807 (W.S. 1940); 24
A . Jun. Gifts § 49 (1939).
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fore void.3 Consequently, the burden is placed upon the donee to
prove by "clear and satisfactory" evidence that the gift was not obtained by use of undue influence. 4 The relationship necessary to raise
the presumption may be of any kind which implies confidence, e.g.,
guardian and ward, physician and patient, nurse and invalid, attorney
and client, or any other relation of confidence between persons which
gives one dominion or influence over the other.5 The presumption of
invalidity applies also to transactions other than gifts. Thus, a deed,
contract, or mortgage will be presumed invalid if the person benefiting
from the transaction occupied the dominant position over the other
in a confidential relationship. 6
In the Nicholas case there was ample evidence to establish the existence of a confidential relationship between the donor and donee.
However, the more serious question in the case was whether the
evidence presented by the donee was sufficient to rebut the presumption of undue influence. Circumstances favorable to the donee on the
question were: (1) the donor's next of kin were her nieces and
nephews, the donee being her favorite; (2) the gift did not seem to
be improvident; 7 (3) the donor was prompted to make the gifts by
fear that her husband's relatives would contest the will which she
had made, leaving most of her property to the parties involved in this
suit; and (4) substantial inter vivos gifts were also made to the appellants. There was testimony to the effect that the donee did not in
fact exercise any undue influence on the donor, and that the gifts were
made freely and voluntarily by the donor. On the other hand, there
was evidence that the donor was old; that she had been deteriorating
both physically and mentally for several years prior to the time of the
gifts; and that she depended greatly upon the donee for assistance in
her business affairs.
There is no general rule as to what evidence is sufficient to rebut
the presumption of undue influence. 8 In some states there is a rule
of equity requiring proof that the donor had competent, independent
advice from a disinterested party before the gift will be allowed to
3. Turner v. Leathers, 191 Tenn. 292, 232 S.W.2d 269 (1950); Miller v.
Proctor, supra note 2; 24 AM. JuR. Gifts § 116 (1939); see Sumpter v. Sandifer,
18 Tenn. App. 60, 72 S.W.2d 782 (1933); noted 13 TENN. L. REV. 58 (1933).
4. Graves v. White, 63 Tenn. 38 (1874); Martin v. Martin, 48 Tenn. 644
(1870).
5. Bayliss v. Williams, 46 Tenn. 440 (1869); 17A Am. Jun. Duress and Undue Influence § 39 (1957).
6. Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 636, 166 S.W.2d 641 (M.S. 1942). For a
discussion of the rules applicable when the beneficiary of a will occupies the
dominant position of a confidential relationship with the testator, see 1
PRICHARD,

WILLS AND ADMrNISTRATION OF ESTATES

§ 133

(3rd. ed., Phillips

1955); Annot., 154 A.L.R. 583 (1945).
7. For cases considering the improvidence of the gift as evidence of undue
influence, see Annot., 160 A.L.R. 1133 (1946).
8. See 17A Am. JuR. Duress and Undue Influence § 41 (1957).
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stand. 9 However, the prevailing view seems to be that there is
no such arbitrary rule, although independent advice, or the lack of it,
is a circumstance to be considered.' 0 There are a few recent Tennessee
decisions including the Nicholas case which purport to follow the
minority view that independent advice is essential to rebut the presumption." However, these decisions, although stating the rule as a
general proposition, indicate that independent advice will not be required to sustain the gift in every case where the presumption of undue influence arises solely from the existence of a confidential relationship. In each of the Tennessee decisions considering the necessity
of independent advice there were either circumstances in addition
to the confidential relationship which made the presumption particularly strong;' 2 or the evidence did not in fact rebut the presumption and therefore the gift would not have been sustained even if
there were no rule requiring such advice; 13 or the court has alleviated
the harshness of the rule by being extremely liberal in finding that
the donor had independent advice. 14
9. See cases cited in Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1505 (1939).

This is the rule in

New Jersey, and if the gift consists of all or the bulk of the donor's property
the gift will not be allowed to stand even though evidence other than that
of independent advice establishes that the gift was not obtained by undue
influence. Croper v. Clegg, 123 N.J. Eq. 332, 197 Atl. 13 (1938); Pearce v.
Stines, 79 N.J. Eq. 51, 80 Atl. 941 (1911); Slack v. Rees, 66 N.J. Eq. 447, 59
Atl. 466 (1904). Such strict application of the rule makes independent advice an essential element of an inter vivos gift, and in effect, prevents the
dependent party of a confidential relationship from making a gift to the
dominant party unless he first seeks the advice of a third party.
10. See Kidd v. Williams, 132 Ala. 140, 31 So. 458 (1901); Zimmerman v.
Freshour, 108 Md. 115, 69 Atl. 796 (1908); Israel v. Sommer, 292 Mass. 113,
197 N.E. 442 (1935); Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1505 (1939).
11. See Miller v. Hubbs, 199 Tenn. 237, 285 S.W.2d 527 (1955); Turner v.
Leathers, 191 Tenn. 292, 232 S.W.2d 269 (1950); Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn.
App. 636, 166 S.W.2d 641 (M.S. 1942). In Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn. App. 439,
145 S.W.2d 807 (W.S. 1940), the court considered the rule of independent advice in determining whether or not the presumption was rebutted, but that
case did not state as a general proposition that independent advice was
essential to rebut the presumption. In Hester v. Hester, 81 Tenn. 189, 192
(1884), the court stated that the donee must "show that he had no voice in
the transaction, or if he had, that his action was free from fault, or that the
donor had the benefit of a full consultation with some disinterested third person." (Emphasis added.)
12. In Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 636, 166 S.W.2d 641 (M.S. 1942),
the gift was improvident and the relationship of attorney-client existed between the donee's husband, who drew the deed for the gift in question, and
the donor. In Turner v. Leathers, 191 Tenn. 292, 299, 232 S.W.2d 269, 271
(1950), the court stated: "Under the circumstances presented in this cause,
on account of age, physical and mental deterioration of the donor, and where
he is under the unquestioned 'dominion and control' of the donee, it is necessary that he have competent, independent advice, free from the influence of
the donee, in order for the gift to stand." (Emphasis added.)
13. See Miller v. Proctor, 24 Tenn. App. 439, 145 S.W.2d 807 (W.S. 1940).
14. In Miller v. Hubbs, 199 Tenn. 237, 285 S.W.2d 527 (1955), the gift was to
the brother of the donor's husband, after the death of the latter, and the
"independent advice" which the court held sufficient was in the form of a
suggestion from the donor's husband before he died. See Smith, Personal
Property and Sales, 9 VAND. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1956), where the author in
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It would seem to be a fair conclusion from the Tennessee decisions
that if the presumption of undue influence arising solely from the
existence of a confidential relationship is rebutted by other evidence,
failure of the donee to prove that the donor had competent, independent advice will not invalidate the gift; but that in some cases,
considering all the circumstances in addition to the confidential relationship, the only effective way to prove that the gift was not the result of undue influence is to prove that the donor had competent, independent advice before making the gift.15
In the Nicholas case, the court held that the evidence fully rebutted
the presumption of undue influence, and that the test of "independent
6
advice" as set out in Turner v. Leathers1
was met by the evidence.
Because of the age, the physical weakness and mental deterioration
of the donor, and her great dependence on the donee at the time of
the gifts, it is believed that this case falls in that category where special circumstances in addition to the confidential relationship require
proof of independent advice before the presumption is rebutted. Even
so, the court was not too strict in the character of advice required
17
to rebut the presumption.
The other case, concerning a gift between persons of a confidential
relationship, held that the mere existence of a parent-child relationship is not sufficient to raise a presumption that a gift from the parent
to the child was obtained by undue influence. 18 The donee in the case
was not the natural child of the donor. However, the court held that
the donor stood in loco parentis to the donee and therefore applied
the same rule that it would in the case of a gift from parent to child.'0
commenting upon this case states: "In lessening the rigors of the rule in the
Turner case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee moves along with the modern
tendency to examine all circumstances of a gift to see if it is freely made but
to avoid the automatic application of technical doctrines that would defeat
the clear intent of the donor."
15. "A clear and important distinction certainly exists between saying that
in particular circumstances a transaction could not be supported in the absence of independent advice, and saying that a general rule of equity exists
which makes independent advice indispensable to the validity of transactions
between persons occupying a fiduciary relationship." Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1505,
1512 (1939).
16. 191 Tenn. 292, 232 S.W.2d 269 (1950).
17. ' We hold that during this period of time Mrs. Wright had the benefit

of competent independent advice, free from the influence of Miss Lewis
[Nicholas] or any of the donees, and particularly in the person of her banker,
Mr. Allison, and her tax accountant, Mr. Ivy. Both of these persons were
friends of long-standing in whom she had great confidence and who, collectively, were familiar with all the gifts as they were being made through the
years and they had every opportunity to know whether or not she was being
overreached and to have assisted her if they had thought she was being overreached or subjected to improper influence." Nicholas v. Wright, 301 S.W.2d
540, 548 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
18. Hollis v. Thomas, 303 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
19. Accord, Sears v. Vaughn, 230 Ill. 572, 82 N.E. 881 (1907). For a general
discussion of the rights, duties and liabilities of a person standing in loco
parentis to another, see 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 72 (1950).
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There have been only a few Tennessee cases which have even considered the relationship of parent and child as affecting the validity
a
of an inter vivos gift.20 In two of these cases the court considered 21
stranger.
a
to
gift
a
as
valid
as
just
child
his
to
gift from a parent
In two others, the court held that the gift was presumptively invalid
and that the burden was upon the donee to prove that it was not obtained by undue influence. 22
Because of the fact that in the Tennessee decisions applying the presumption of invalidity to a gift from parent to child there were circumstances in addition to the mere parent-child relationship which
should give rise to the presumption,2 it is believed that they are not
in conflict with the cases holding that there was no such presumption,
and that they are in accord with the rules applied in other jurisdictions, as discussed below. The apparent inconsistency in the Tennessee
cases results from the failure of the decisions, prior to Hollis v.
Thomas2 4 specifically to determine the relation of the rule applied
in the particular case involving a gift from parent to child to the
more comprehensive rule that a gift from the dependent party to the
dominant party of a confidential relationship is presumed invalid.2
The Hollis case, determining that a gift from parent to child is not
26
within this latter rule, is in accord with the great weight of authority,
the obvious reason being that the parent is presumed to be the dominant party of the relationship. 27 Therefore, before a presumption of
undue influence will arise, the party attacking the validity of the gift
must first prove that time and circumstances have reversed the order
20. See Martin v. Martin, 48 Tenn. 644 (1870); Belcher v. Belcher, 18 Tenn.
121 (1836); Williams v. Walton, 16 Tenn. 387 (1835); Roberts v. Chase, 25

Tenn. App. 636, 166 S.W.2d 641 (M.S. 1942).
21. Belcher v. Belcher, supra note 20; Williams v. Walton, supra note 20.

22. Martin v. Martin, 48 Tenn. 644 (1870); Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App.

636, 166 S.W.2d 641 (M.S. 1942).
23. In Martin v. Martin, 48 Tenn. 644 (1870), the court found that there
was also a relationship of principal and agent between the donor and donee;

and that the donor, father of the donee, was aged, infirm and in a distressed
state of mind at the time of the gift. In Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 636,
166 S.W.2d 641 (M.S. 1942), the husband of one of the donees was an attorney, and prepared the deed conveying the bulk of the father's property
to two of his children, who were established in life, to the exclusion of his
wife and children by a second marriage.
24. 303 S.W.2d 751 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
25. In Belcher v. Belcher, 18 Tenn. 121 (1836), and Williams v. Walton, 16
Tenn. 387 (1835), the court, in upholding the gifts, did not even discuss the
presumption applicable under the general rule. In Martin v. Martin, 48 Tenn.
644 (1870), and Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 636, 166 S.W.2d 641 (M.S.

1942), in applying the presumption of invalidity, the court was not troubled
at all by the fact that the gift was from parent to child.

26. Francis v. Wilkinson, 147 Ill. 370, 35 N.E. 150 (1893); McKinney v.

Hensley, 74 Mo. 326 (1881); Eggert v. Schroeder, 158 Neb. 65, 62 N.W.2d 266
(1954); In re Kamen's Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Surr. Ct. 1950); Andrekanics
v. Andrekanics, 371 Pa. 222, 89 A.2d 792 (1952); 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child §
60 (1950); 24 AM. Jus. Gifts § 116 (1939). See cases cited in Annot., 11 A.L.R.
735 (1921), on the question of the validity of a gift from child to parent.
27. Lee v. Menefield, 249 Ala. 407, 31 So. 2d 581 (1947).
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of nature and that the child is the dominant party.28 According to
these rules there is, of course, no presumption of invalidity of a gift
from a parent to an infant child.29 The problem becomes more difficult when an aged parent, who is physically and mentally weak makes
a gift to an adult son or daughter, 30 and when to these facts are added
other suspicious circumstances, such as where the effect of the gift
is to improverish the parent, 31 or where the gift is an unnatural disposition or results in an unequal distribution of the donor's property
among his other children and spouse,32 it is generally held that a pre33
sumption of undue influences arises.
It is also generally held that if in addition to the family relationship,
there is also a confidential or fiduciary relationship which would ordinarily give rise to the presumption, the child being the dominant
party of that relationship, then a gift from the parent to the child
will be presumed invalid.34
In the Hollis case the gifts consisted of three bank accounts amounting to several thousand dollars, which the donor had transferred to
joint-survivorship accounts in the name of the donor and donee shortly
before her death. The donor had other property. The donee had
been a member of the donor's household from the time she was nine
years old until she was married, and was always treated as a daughter.
The donor had no other children. Therefore, the gifts would seem to
be natural and reasonable. Although the donor had lived with the
donee continuously for approximately four years before her death
at age seventy-nine, except for the few days she was in the hospital
during her last illness, and had given the donee a general power of
attorney 35 which she never used, there was in fact no other confidential
or fiduciary relationship between the donor and donee as to business
or financial matters. Therefore, since there were no circumstances
other than the age of the donor and the mere parent-child relationship which cast suspicion on the gift, and since there was no evidence
of actual undue influences, the court was clearly correct in holding
28. Dillard v. Hovater, 254 Ala. 616, 49 So. 2d 151 (1950); Cluzel v. Brown,
133 N.J. Eq. 156, 29 A.2d 864; 67 C.J.S. Parent and Child § 60 (1950).
29. This was the situation in Williams v. Walton, 16 Tenn. 387 (1835).
30. See Smith v. Smith, 84 Kan. 242, 114 Pac. 245 (1911).
31. Croissant v. Beers, 118 Ill. App. 502 (1905); Post v. Hagan, 71 N.J. Eq.
234, 65 Atl. 1026 (1907). Cf. Soberanes v. Soberanes, 97 Cal. 140, 31 Pac. 910
(1893).

32. Gibson v. Hammang, 63 Neb. 349, 88 N.W. 500 (1901); see Martin v.
Martin, 48 Tenn. 644 (1870).
33. See cases collected in Annot., 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 944 (1912).
34. See Krieg v. Felgner, 400 Ill. 113, 79 N.E.2d 60 (1948); Hilgenfeld v.
Johnson, 176 Kan. 339, 270 P.2d 293 (1954); Meley v. De Coursey, 204 Md.
648, 106 A.2d 65 (1954); Roberts v. Chase, 25 Tenn. App. 636, 166 S.W.2d 641
(M.S. 1942).
35. It seems as though the mere fact that the child has a power of attorney
from the parent is not sufficient to raise the presumption of invalidity. See
Crothers v. Crothers, 149 Pa. 201, 24 Atl. 190 (1892).
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that there was no presumption of undue influence, and that the gift
was valid.
In First Nat'l Bank v. Howard,36 the court was called upon to determine whether the evidence presented by the alleged donee was
sufficient to establish two familiar, essential elements of an inter vivos
gift: (1) intention of the donor to make a gift and (2) delivery of
the subject matter of the gift.
The alleged donor, Mrs. Martin, was a widow, childless, and eightyfive years old at the time of her death in 1955. For the last four years
of her life she was an invalid confined in a hospital. When expecting
visitors at the hospital she would send Howard to the bank, where she
had left her valuables for safe keeping in charge of its president, for
her brooch and rings, wear them for the occasion and then return them
to the bank by Howard.
In October of 1953, Howard called for the brooch in question which
was delivered to her by the president of the bank who thought that
Martin had sent for it to wear and would send it back. Howard never
returned the brooch. Martin bequeathed the brooch to a Mrs. Potter,
a diamond ring to Howard and other items of personalty to relatives
and friends.
The complainant qualified as executor of Martin's will and brought
a suit in replevin to recover the brooch from Howard, who claimed
that the brooch had been given to her by Martin before she died. The
chancellor held that there was no gift and Howard appealed.
It is well settled that one affirmatively asserting a gift has the
burden of proving every essential element 37 by "clear, cogent and
convincing" evidence.3 Any doubt as to the intent of the alleged
donor to make a gift or of delivery of the subject matter must be
resolved against the hypothesis of a gift.39 The evidence relied upon
by the defendant Howard to meet this burden was: (1) her possession
of the brooch; (2) the appellant's own testimony that she got the
brooch from the president of the bank only after Martin had told
her the day before at the hospital that she (Martin) wanted to give
her the brooch and insisted that she go by and pick it up; and (3) declarations of Martin subsequent to the alleged gift (testified to by
36. 302 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
37. Pamplin v. Satterfield, 196 Tenn. 297, 265 S.W.2d 886 (1954); Figuers v.
Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S.W.2d 629 (1944); Scholze v. Scholze, 2 Tenn.
App. 80 (M.S. 1925).
38. Lenow v. Bank of Commerce & Trust Co., 4 Tenn. App. 218 (W.S.
1927); Royston v. McCulley, 59 S.W. 725 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900); 38 C.J.S.
Gifts § 67 (1943).
39. Chandler v. Roddy, 163 Tenn. 338, 43 S.W.2d 400 (1931); American
Na1. Bank v. Robinson, 27 Tenn. App. 644, 184 S.W.2d 393 (M.S. 1944); Ferry
v. Bryant, 19 Tenn. App. 612, 93 S.W.2d 344 (E.S. 1935).
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two witnesses) to the effect that she wanted Howard to have the
brooch and that she "was giving" the brooch to Howard.
The court, in sustaining the chancellor's ruling that the testimony
of Howard was incompetent under the Dead Man's Statute, 40 and that
the evidence was insufficient to establish the gift, applied certain
rules which, because of the ease with which property may be claimed
as a gift in a case such as this, are necessary to prevent fraud, discourage perjury and remove the temptation to defeat the will of the
41
dead.
Evidence of possession of the subject of the alleged gift by one
claiming the property as a gift is admissible.4 2 However, it is not
alone sufficient evidence of a gift, and when the gift is first asserted
after the death of the alleged donor, and the claimant has had access
to the property of the alleged donor during his last illness or after his
death, or his possession can be reasonably accounted for in any other
way, the possession has little, if any, weight on the question of a
43

gift.

Declarations in the nature of admissions of the alleged donor are
also admissible in evidence to show that he had made a gift.44 There
is a conflict of authority on the question of whether or not delivery of
a gift may be proved solely by declarations of the donor that he "has
given" the property to the donee, but probably the weight of authority
40. "In actions or proceedings by or against executors, administrators, or
guardians, in which judgments may be rendered for or against them, neither
party shall be allowed to testify against the other as to any transaction with
or statement by the testator, intestate, or ward, unless called to testify thereto
by the opposite party." TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-105 (1956). Under this statute,
testimony of an alleged donee as to what was said to him by decedent donor
in respect to the alleged gift is not admissible when gift is claimed as
against the personal representative of the decedent. Royston v. McCulley, 59
S.W. 725 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1900); Wilson v. Wilson, 151 Tenn. 486, 267 S.W.

364 (1924).

41. See Atchley v. Rimmer, 148 Tenn. 303, 255 S.W. 366 (1923), a case
very similar to First Nat'l Bank v. Howard, 302 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. App. M.S.
1957). The Atchley case was relied upon by the court in the latter case as
authority for holding that there was no gift. In the Atchley case, as in the
First National Bank case, the evidence relied upon by the claimant to prove
the gift was the testimony of the claimant, possession of the subject matter
of the alleged gift, and declarations of the alleged donor.
42. Atchley v. Rimmer, 148 Tenn. 303, 255 S.W. 366 (1923); 24 AM. Jua.

Gifts § 118 (1939).

43. Atchley v. Rimmer, 148 Tenn. 303, 311, 255 S.W. 366, 369 (1923); 38 C.J.S.
Gifts § 67(b) (1943). In Mason v. Willhite, 61 S.W. 298, 299 (Tenn. Ch. App.
1900), the court stated: "[I]t is to be said that she [donee] was found in
possession of the notes at the time of her mother's death . . .; and possession
itself is presumptive evidence of ownership." The Atchley case, supra at 308,
255 S.W. at 368, held that this statement was not correct. The Mason case,
supra, sustained the gift on evidence of the possession by the donee and
declarations of the donor indicating that a gift had been made.
44. Hesse v. Hemberger, 39 S.W. 1063 (Tenn. Ch. App. 1896); Annot., 105
A.L.R. 398 (1936).
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holds that such declarations, in themselves, are not sufficient to prove
45
delivery.
In Atchley v. Rimmer,46 the Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed
the cases from other jurisdictions on the question and determined that
proof of such declarations alone are not sufficient to prove delivery of
the alleged gift. Of course, if declarations of the donor are not suffi4
cient to prove delivery, they are not sufficient to establish a gift. "
The declarations proved in the FirstNational Bank case did not even
amount to an admission by the alleged donor that she "had given" the
brooch to Howard, but only that she wanted Howard to have it and
that she was giving it to Howard. It is doubtful that proof of such
declarations alone would be sufficient in any jurisdiction to establish
delivery or consequently a gift. The court also held that these statements fall short of showing an intent on the part of the alleged donor
48
to give a present interest, as required to establish an inter vivos gift.
Mechanics' Lien: In ChattanoogaLumber & Coal Corp. v. Phillips49
the complainant filed a bill to have a lien declared upon the property
of Beene and wife to secure payment of the amount due for materials
furnished to Phillips who had contracted with the Beenes to make
improvements on their property. The Title Guaranty & Trust Company, trustee under a deed of trust to secure the Rossville Federal
Savings and Loan Association, Beene and wife, the owners of the
property, and Phillips, the contractor, were all made defendants. The
bill also prayed that the "rights, interests and priorities be fixed and
declared by the court."
The bill alleged that complainant gave due notice to the owners of
the property of his claim of lien within the time required by law;
that the lien claim was filed for record on September 22, 1956; and
that complainant's first delivery of materials was prior to the registration of the deed of trust on June 7, 1956. Beene and wife demurred to
the bill on the ground that the lien claim was not acknowledged as required to entitle an instrument to registration.5 0 The chancellor sus45. See cases collected in Annot., 124 A.L.R. 1391 (1940).
46. 148 Tenn. 303, 255 S.W. 366 (1923).
47. The court in First Nat1 Bank v. Howard, 302 S.W.2d 516, 520 (Tenn. App.

M.S. 1957) held that "a gift cannot be established by proof of declarations of

the donor alone," and cited Atchley v. Rimmer, 148 Tenn. 303, 255 S.W. 366

(1923). However, the latter case only determined that delivery could not be
sustained by proof of a declaration of the alleged donor that he "had given"
the property to the alleged donee. The Atchley case, supra at 323, 255 S.W.
at 372, indicates that declarations of the donor that actual delivery has been
made, or of facts from which actual delivery may be inferred, are sufficient
to establish delivery.
48. See Figuers v. Sherrell, 181 Tenn. 87, 178 S.W.2d 629 (1944); Chandler v.
Roddy, 163 Tenn. 338, 43 S.W.2d 400 (1931).
49. 304 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1957).
50. "To authenticate an instrument for registration, its execution shall be
acknowledged by the maker, or proved by two (2) subscribing witnesses, at
least." TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-2201 (1956).
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tained the demurrer and dismissed the bill and the complainant appealed.
In affirming the decision of the chancellor, the court held that since
the complainant sought to establish priority of his lien over the deed
of trust, registration of the lien claim was required, and since the lien
claim was not acknowledged, it was not entitled to registration and
was without any legal efficacy to sustain it as against the holders of
the deed of trust.51
There is little question, according to the facts alleged in the bill, that
the claimant's lien would have had priority over the deed of trust had
the lien claim which he recorded been acknowledged. He had complied
with the notice requirements of the statute, 52 and since the claim was
recorded within the time required,5 3 if the recordation had been valid,
the lien could have related back and taken effect from the time of
"visible commencement of operations"' which allegedly was prior to
the recordation of the deed of trust.
The court rejected the contention of the corporation that since the
Mechanics' Lien Statute was passed many years after section 64-2201, 55
the former must have obviated any requirement of acknowledgment
of lien claims in order to be admitted to registration. Although the
Mechanics' Lien Statute does not specifically state that the lien claim
must be acknowledged in order to be registered, the reasons for requiring acknowledgement of a mechanics' lien claim would seem to
be just as strong as those for requiring acknowledgment of any other
instrument.
Since the court held that the lien claim must be acknowledged in
order to be admitted to record, the fact that it was improperly admitted to record without an acknowledgment would not afford constructive notice of its existence and contents.56
51. For a general discussion of the Tennessee Mechanics' Lien Statute, TENN.
ANN. §§ 64-1101 to 1142 (1956), including its nature, scope and origin,
and the notice and filing requirements necessary to perfect and preserve the
lien, see Hartman, Creditors'Rights and Security Transactions-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REv. 799 (1954).
52. A subcontractor or person not dealing directly with the owner of the
property on which the improvement is being made must give the owner notice
that a lien is claimed, within ninety days after the work is completed or the
expiration of the claimant's contract, in order to preserve his lien. TENN.
CODE

CODE

ANN. § 64-1115 (1956).

53. In order for the lien to have precedence over subsequent liens or conveyances, a sworn statement of the lien claim, containing the amount due and
a description of the premises, must be filed for registration by the claimant
within ninety days after completion of the work or expiration of his contract.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-1117 (1956).

54.

TENN. CODE ANN. §

64-1104 (1956).

"Visible commencement of opera-

tions" is defined in § 64-1101 to include "the first delivery to the site of the
improvement of materials which remain thereon until actually incorporated
in the improvement ...
55. See note 50 supra.
56. Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d 1299, 1302 (1958).
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The decision is in accord with earlier Tennessee cases requiring
strict compliance with the statute in order to preserve a mechanic's
lien.57
Fraudulent Conveyances: Ih Nashville Milk Producers v. Alston 58
the complainant sought to set aside a conveyance of a herd of dairy
cattle from Ivo Alston to his wife, and from the wife to their son.
Complainant was a cooperative marketing association of which
Alston was a member. Alston became indebted to complainant for feed
purchased during the months of July through November of 1954.
Complainant's bill alleged that the conveyance from Ivo Alston to his
wife occurred on December 1, 1953, and that from the wife to the
son on February 26, 1955; that the transfers were not made for a fair
consideration; that the transfers rendered the grantors insolvent and
execution-proof; and that the transfers were a part of a scheme contrived by all three defendants to delay, hinder and defraud complainant in the collection of his debt.
The answers of the defendants contained general denials of any
fraud and alleged that the two transfers were for a sufficient and
valuable consideration, without stating what the consideration was.
Evidence presented by the complainant showed that it did not learn
of the conveyances, through its secretary-treasurer, until after they
were made. There was no visible change in the ownership of the
herd, Ivo Alston continuing to manage the dairy after the conveyances
were made. He also leased the land on which the cattle were kept in
his own name, the last yearly lease being executed on October 1, 1955.
The feed for which the debt was incurred was used to feed the same
herd of cattle. The evidence did not show whether or not the conveyances were in writing, but there were no bills of sale from Alston
to his wife or from the wife to the son recorded. At about the time
of the conveyances the milk account was changed on the books of the
Federal Milk Market Administrator to Mrs. Alston's name and later to
the name of the son. There were numerous judgments against Ivo
Alston obtained by his creditors in 1954 and 1955 in the general
session court. Neither of the defendants testified at the trial, and
no evidence was presented in their behalf.
The chancellor awarded a judgment against Ivo Alston for the
amount of the debt but dismissed the bill insofar as it sought to set
aside the conveyances. The court of appeals held that the complainant's proof cast a strong suspicion of fraud and a purpose to hinder and
delay the creditors of Ivo Alston on the defendants, and that since
57. See McDonnell v. Amo, 162 Tenn. 36, 34 S.W.2d 212 (1931); Henderson
v. Watson, 25 Tenn. App. 506, 160 S.W.2d 429 (E.S. 1942).
58. 307 S.W.2d 66 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
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no evidence was offered by them to dispel such suspicion, the conveyances- should be set aside.
Under the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act5 9 there are three
sections which declare certain conveyances fraudulent as to persons
who extend credit to the transferor subsequent to the conveyance,6 0
as was the case here. Even prior to the adoption of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act 6 a conveyance made with the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud future creditors was void as to them.62
It is difficult to determine in the instant case upon just what section
of the code the court based its decision. The court did paraphrase sections 64-313 and 64-314,63 commenting that section 64-313 did not require actual intent to defraud. 64
Although there was no conclusive evidence of an actual intent on
the part of defendants to hinder, delay or defraud subsequent creditors, there were several "badges of fraud" 65 from which such an intent
could be found. The fact that the conveyance attacked by the complainant was from husband to wife is not itself a badge of fraud,66
but a conveyance from husband to wife whereby the property is placed
beyond the reach of the husband's creditors is closely scrutinized by
the courts, 67 and where the conveyance is attended with suspicious cir-

cumstances the burden is upon the wife to rebut the inference of
fraud.6
59. TENN. CODE ANN.

§§

64-313 to -321 (1956).

60. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 64-313 to -315 (1956). Section 64-313 makes every
conveyance, without fair consideration, by a person engaged in a business or
about to engage in a business fraudulent as to future creditors if the property
remaining in his hands after the conveyance is an unreasonably small capital

"without regard to his actual interest." Section 64-314 makes a conveyance
fraudulent as to future creditors if made without a fair consideration and if
the person making the conveyance "intends or believes that he will incur debts
beyond his ability to pay as they mature." Section 64-315 declares the
conveyance fraudulent as to future creditors if made with actual intent, as
distinguished from intent presumed in law, to 'hinder, delay or defraud" such
creditors.
61. Tenn. Pub. Acts 1919, ch. 125.
62. Churchill v. Wells, 47 Tenn. 364 (1870); Nicholas v. Ward, 38 Tenn. 323
(1858).
63. See note 60 supra.
64. It is interesting to note that conveyances coming within the terms of
section 64-313 are declared fraudulent without regard to the "actual interest"
of the person making the conveyance, whereas the draftsmen of the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act use "intent" instead of "interest." Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act § 5. According to the comment of the court in the
Alston case, however, the substitution of "interest" for "intent" by the Tennessee Legislature does not make proof of actual intent to defraud necessary
under section 64-313.
65. A badge of fraud is a fact or circumstance which if not explained by the
defendant will warrant an inference of fraud. See Bank of Blount County v.
Dunn, 10 Tenn. App. 95 (E.S. 1929); 37 C.J.S. Fraudulent Conveyances § 79
(1943).
66. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 12 Tenn. App. 583 (M.S. 1930).
67. Union Bank v. Chaffin, 24 Tenn. App. 528, 147 S.W.2d 414 (M.S. 1940).
68. Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. White, 12 Tenn. App. 583 (M.S. 1930).
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It is also generally held that where the transferor of the property
remains in possession thereof after the conveyance, this fact is a
badge of fraud, casting the burden on the transferee to prove that the
69
transaction was fair and bona fide.
Although the evidence in the Alston case did not conclusively prove
that the conveyance rendered the complainant insolvent, the judgments against him for various debts show that he was financially embarrassed, and he must have anticipated incurring future debts in
the operation of the dairy. In spite of the suspicious circumstances and
badges of fraud, none of the defendants testified or offered any evidence to prove that there was in fact any consideration paid for the
cattle, or that the husband had any property left with which to pay
his debts after the conveyance. The failure of the defendants to
testify or to produce evidence to rebut these circumstances is itself a
0
badge of fraud, justifying a finding against them.7
In Beaty v. Hood,71 another case involving an alleged fraudulent
conveyance, the complainant, a judgment creditor, sought to set aside
a conveyance of a truck from husband to wife. The chancellor dismissed the bill on the ground that the evidence did not support the
findings, and on appeal the court was asked to reverse the findings of
the chancellor, although all the court of appeals had before it was
the technical record, some exhibits and a bill of exceptions which
omitted the testimony of several witnesses.
The evidence presented on behalf of the complainant showed that
he had obtained a judgment against defendant Porter Hood for $339.34
on February 8, 1956, and that the execution was returned nulla bona.
A copy of an application for certificate of title showed that defendant
Gertie Hood applied for the certificate on April 7, 1955, but did not
show from whom she had acquired the truck. Complainant testified
that he had seen Mr. Porter in possession of the truck. Apparently,
the evidence did not even show when the debt for which complainant
had obtained a judgment was incurred.
The testimony of the two defendants showed that Gertie Hood had
traded in a 1948 model truck on the truck in question; that she had
owned the truck in question for "a long time" before the judgment was
obtained against her husband and that the husband was not the owner
of the truck nor did he have any interest in it. A certificate of
registration on the 1948 truck was issued to Gertie Hood on April 7,
1952.
69. Grubbs v. Greer, 45 Tenn. 160 (1867); Hewgley v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 39 Tenn. App. 553, 286 S.W.2d 355 (M.S. 1955).
70. Union Bank v. Chaffin, 24 Term. App. 528, 147 S.W.2d 414 (M.S. 1940);
Hartnett v. Doyle, 16 Tenn. App. 302, 64 S.W.2d 227 (M.S. 1932); Citizens Bank
and Trust Co. v. White, 12 Tenn. App. 583 (M.S. 1930).
71. 306 S.W.2d 671 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
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The meager evidence for the complainant, as the court pointed out,
did not even establish that the husband ever transferred the truck to
the wife. Upon this set of facts it is clear that the allegations of a
fraudulent conveyance were not established, and when considered in
view of the presumption of the correctness of the chancellor's findings
of facts,7 2 are certainly not sufficient to reverse the finding of the
chancellor that there was no fraudulent conveyance.
Motor Vehicle Title and Registration Law: The case of Manufacturers Acceptance Corp v. Vaughn73 was one of the few in which the
court was faced with the difficult task of construing several sections
of Tennessee's Motor Vehicle Title and Registration Law. 74 Its enactment in 1951 substantially changed the methods by which encumbrancers may preserve their liens on automobiles as against subsequent creditors and innocent purchasers. For instance, in Tennessee a
conditional vendor is not required to record the conditional sales contract in order to have priority over a subsequent encumbrancer or
purchaser without notice;75 however, since the enactment of the Motor
Vehicle Title and Registration Law, the conditional vendor of a motor
vehicle must have his lien noted on the owner's certificate of title to
the automobile in order for it to have priority over the liens of subsequent encumbrances and purchasers without notice.7 6 Although
chattel mortgages must be recorded in Tennessee to be valid as against
subsequent creditors and purchasers,7 7 since 1951 the fact that a
chattel mortgage on a motor vehicle, is or is not recorded is immaterial insofar as determining the rights of the creditors of the
owner of the automobile or subsequent purchasers without actual
notice of the mortgage.78 The methods provided by the Motor Vehicle Title and Registration Law of giving constructive notice of a
79
mortgage on a motor vehicle are exclusive.
In the Vaughn case one Cookston traded in his 1953 Chevrolet automobile to Gentry Motor Company on a truck. At the time of the
trade, General Motors Acceptance Corporation had a lien on the automobile and was holding Cookston's certificate of title. Gentry paid off
G.M.A.C.'s lien and G.M.A.C. forwarded the certificate of title to
Cookston. In the meantime Gentry sold the automobile to Vaughn,
executing and delivering a bill of sale to Vaughn, and taking a title
retention note from Vaughn to secure the balance of the purchase
72. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-303 (1956).

73. 305 S.W.2d 513 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1957).
74. TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 59-101 to -608 (1956).
75. Shaw v. Webb, 131 Tenn. 173, 174 S.W. 273 (1914); Knoxville Outfitting
Co. v. Knoxville Fireproof Storage Co., 160 Tenn. 203, 22 S.W.2d 354 (1929).
76. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-326 (1956).
77. TENN. CODE ANN. § 64-901 (1956).
78. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-327(b) (1956).
79. Ibid. See 23 TENN. L. REV. 238 (1954).
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price. A few days later Vaughn obtained the certificate of title from
Cookston's wife and appeared with one Henderson before a notary
public where Henderson posed as Cookston and forged Cookston's
name to an assignment of the certificate of title.
With this certificate of title bearing a forged assignment from Cookston to Vaughn, the latter applied to Southern Acceptance Corporation
for a loan. Southern declined to make a loan on the automobile, informing Vaughn that it would be necessary for him to have the title
transferred to his own name. Following this advice, he went to the
office of the county court clerk and applied to the State Motor Vehicle
Division for a new certificate of title in his name. With his copy of the
application for a certificate of title, Vaughn went to Manufacturers Acceptance Corporation and obtained two loans amounting to $1,000.
About three weeks later M.A.C. forwarded Vaughn's copy of the application, together with proof of its lien, to the Motor Vehicle Division
to have the lien noted on the certificate of title. Before these papers
were received the division had already acted on Vaughn's application
and had forwarded to him a certificate of title in his name with no
liens noted thereon.
With his lien-free certificate of title, Vaughn went back to Southern
and obtained a loan of $797.14. Southern took Vaughn's certificate
of title and forwarded it, along with proof of its lien on the car, to
the division. The certificate was returned to Southern showing it to
be the only lienor. Subsequently, M.A.C.'s papers finally reached
Nashville, and the division discovered that its claimed lien antedated
that of Southern. The division then requested Southern to return their
papers for correction, which request was refused. In the meantime,
Vaughn had surrendered possession of the automobile to Gentry and
obtained a release of the title retention note.
Vaughn defaulted on his payments to M.A.C. and the latter commenced a suit in replevin against Vaughn and Gentry, who was in
possession of the automobile. Gentry filed an answer and cross bill
bringing in G.M.A.C., Southern, and the notary public and his surety.
With all the necessary parties before him and the question as to who
had the superior lien on the automobile sufficiently presented by the
pleadings and evidence, the chancellor decided in favor of Southern.
He absolved G.M.A.C. and the notary public of all liability. The
court of appeals affirmed the chancellor's decision in all respects.
As to the liability of G.M.A.C., it is obvious that it complied with the
statute and was in no way responsible for Gentry's loss. Section 59314 (d) 80 requires a lienor in possession of the owner's certificate of
title to return the certificate to the owner of the automobile upon
discharge of the lien if no other liens are noted on the certificate.
80.

TENN. CODE

ANN.

(1956).
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Therefore, when it returned Cookston's certificate of title to him, it

fulfilled its obligation under the statute.
The real contest of course was between Gentry, M.A.C. and Southern. As to Gentry's claim of priority of lien on the automobile, the
court held that Gentry never perfected title to the car; that it did not
comply with the exclusive method provided by the sections relating
to transfer of title in transferring the car to Vaughn and upon reacquiring the car; and that since Gentry's lien was never noted on
Vaughn's certificate of title, its lien was not valid as against subsequent lienors. Apparently, the court's finding that Gentry did not
comply with the sections relating to transfer of title was based upon
the fact that Gentry never obtained a bill of sale or an assignment of a
certificate of title from Cookston, and therefore it could not transfer
title to Vaughn. Since it was not disputed that Gentry's lien was never
noted on the certificate of title to the automobile, as required to be
valid as against creditors of the owner or subsequent purchasers or
encumbrancers without notice,81 it is clear that under the statute
Gentry's lien did not qualify for priority over the lien of M.A.C. or
Southern. Although this fact alone would be sufficient to deny Gentry's
claim as against M.A.C. and Southern, the opinion of the court goes
further and indicates that Gentry's failure to comply with the statute
in regard to transferring title to Vaughn occasioned his loss, and applied the maxim, "Where one of two persons must suffer loss, he should
suffer whose act or neglect occasioned the loss."2
It is believed that even if Gentry had complied with the requirements of the statute in transferring title to Vaughn, its lien still would
not have been protected against the actions of Vaughn. Starting with
the transfer of the automobile from Cookston to Gentry, the proper
procedure to transfer the title under the law would have been for
Cookston to execute, acknowledge and deliver to Gentry a bill of sale
containing the name and address of the person who had possession of
the certificate of title to the automobile-in this case G.M.A.C. 83
Transfer of title by bill of sale by a person who is not an automobile
dealer is authorized only when the certificate of title is in the possession of a lienor.M Otherwise, the transfer must be accomplished by
the indorsement of an assignment and warranty of title upon the
certificate of title by the owner and delivery of the certificate to the
transferree.8
If Gentry had obtained a bill of sale from Cookston, since it was
an automobile dealer, it could have then transferred title to Vaughn
81. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 59-326 (1956).
82. 305 S.W.2d at 520.
83. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-319 (b) (1956).

84. Ibid.

85. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-319(a) (1956).
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by executing another bill of sale, conforming to the requirements
stated above, and delivering that bill of sale, along with the one it had
obtained from Cookston, to Vaughn. 86 Under the law, a dealer may
transfer title without first obtaining a certificate of title in its own
name.87 Anyone other than a dealer must obtain a certificate of title
in his own name before transferring title to the car to another person. 88
Now supposing that these requirements had been met, Gentry's
lien (the title retention note) on the automobile would never have
been noted on the certificate of title that was later issued by the
division to Vaughn, and consequently would not have been constructive notice to the subsequent lienors-M.A.C. and Southern. This
results from the fact that Vaughn did not use the evidence of title he
had obtained from Gentry in applying for a certificate of title in his
own name, as he was required to do under the law before operating the
89
car.
Could Gentry have protected itself against subsequent lienors, in
view of Vaughn's conduct, simply by sending proof of its lien to the
Motor Vehicle Division? Section 59-32490 provides that when any new
lien is placed upon a motor vehicle in a transaction not involving any
change of ownership, and the owner's certificate of title is in the
possession of some prior lienor, the new or subordinate lienor may
simply forward to the Motor Vehicle Division proof of his lien, and
the division must then call in the certificate of title from the prior
lienor for the sole purpose of noting the new lien thereon. Since
Gentry's lien was placed upon the automobile in a transaction involving a change of ownership, it was expressly precluded by this
section from following this procedure of having its lien noted on the
certificate of title.
Nevertheless, if it had followed this procedure the Motor Vehicle
Division would probably not have issued a certificate of title to
Vaughn until Gentry's lien was noted thereon, or at least until it
was determined who had the superior lien on the automobile. Section
59-31291 provides that the division shall refuse to issue a certificate of
title if it has reasonable ground to believe that the issuance of the
certificate would constitute a fraud against the rightful owner or any
person having a valid lien upon the vehicle. This seems to be the
only way an automobile dealer transferring title by bill of sale might
protect its lien retained upon the transfer against such fraudulent conduct of his transferee as that committed by Vaughn in this case. The
86.

TENN. CODE ANN. §

89.

CODE ANN.
TENN. CODE ANN.
TENN. CODE ANN.

87. Ibid.
88. TENN.
90.
91. Ibid.

59-321 (1956).

§§ 59-320, 59-323 (1956).
§ 59-320 (1956).
(1956).
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only other safe course would be for the dealer to wait until he obtains the certificate of title to the automobile before making a sale.
As to M.A.C.'s claim of priority of lien, the court in the Vaughn
case held:
The Act requires the filing of the instrument creating the lien, with the
certificate of title, except where there is a prior lien and the certificate
is in possession of the prior lienholder. In this event the Motor Vehicle
Division recalls the title certificate in order to note the lien thereon.
M.A.C. had no right under the law to rely on a copy of the application
for title in the first instance. If its agents had insisted on having the
certificate of title itself, either the loan would not have been made, or
the lien would have been properly recorded as the first lien with consequent notice to the world.92
It would seem that M.A.C.'s delinquency in sending proof of its
lien to the Motor Vehicle Division (it waited three weeks) occasioned
its loss rather than its reliance on Vaughn's application for a certificate of title as proof of ownership of the automobile. If M.A.C. had
been prompt in forwarding proof of its lien to the Motor Vehicle Di-

vision there is little doubt that its lien would have been noted on the
certificate of title before it was forwarded to Vaughn and before
Southern had its lien noted thereon.93 However, since M.A.C.'s lien
was not noted on the certificate of title when Southern made its loan
to Vaughn, Southern did not have either actual or constructive notice
of M.A.C.'s lien and therefore was protected by the statute, as a
subsequent encumbrancer without notice.

SALES
Breach of Warranty: In Schaeffer v. Richard94 the court was faced
with the question as to whether or not there was a breach of implied warranty of title by the vendor of an automobile when he executed a bill of sale containing an incorrect motor number, resulting
in the inability of the vendee to obtain a certificate of title to the
automobile.
The error on the part of Schaeffer, the conditional vendor, was

completely innocent, he being the true owner and having a legal right
to sell the automobile. When Richard, the conditional vendee, ap92. 305 S.W.2d at 520.
93. See Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Ware, 195 Tenn. 423, 260 S.W.2d 162
(1953), where the bank made a loan to the owner of the automobile on the
strength of his application for title and a bill of sale, taking a chattel mortgage
as security. Without making any notation of its lien on the owner's application,
the bank merely sent proof of its lien to the division which subsequently noted
the lien on the owner's certificate of title when it was issued. The court held
that the bank's lien was valid as against a subsequent purchaser from the
owner without actual notice. The Ware decision seems to be inconsistent
with the reasoning of the court in the Vaughn case that M.A.C. had no right
to rely on a copy of the application.
94. 306 S.W.2d 340 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
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plied to the State Motor Vehicle Division for a certificate of title, he
was informed by the division that he could not obtain a certificate of
title because the records showed that the car with the motor number
shown on the bill of sale was registered in the name of another person.
Richard, a member of the armed forces, was subsequently transferred to Washington, D. C., and with the consent of Schaeffer drove
the car to his new station. Later, when he received orders to go
overseas, Richard was unable to sell the car because he still did not
have a certificate of title, although the employees of Schaeffer, an
automobile dealer, had agreed to help him obtain one before Richard
left Tennessee.
Richard then obtained the services of a lawyer who notified Schaeffer
of Richard's intention to rescind. Schaeffer's reply, in effect, rejected
the offer to rescind. Richard then turned the automobile over to Associates Discount Corporation, who had purchased Richard's title note
from Schaeffer, returned to Tennessee and instituted suit to rescind
the contract and recover the purchase price paid. The trial court
entered judgment for Richard, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court held that when Schaeffer failed to deliver a properly executed bill of sale as required by the Motor Vehicle Title and Registration Law, so as to enable Richard to obtain a certificate of title under
that law, he was guilty of breach of warranty under section 13 (2)
and (3) of the Uniform Sales Act. 95 These sections provide that in a
contract to sell or a sale, unless a contrary intention appears, there is
an implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy the quiet
possession of the goods as against any lawful claims existing at the
time of sale, and that the goods shall be free at the time of sale from
any charge or encumbrance in favor of any third person. If there is
a breach of implied warranty under these sections, the -buyer has
the option of rescinding the sale, returning the goods and recovering
the purchase price he has paid.96
There is some difficulty in bringing the factual situation of the
Schaeffer case within the language of the implied warranty of title
provisions of the Uniform Sales Act, since the breach complained of
was not the result of any claim against the automobile existing at
the time of sale or of any charge or encumbrance in favor of any
third person. There can be no doubt, however, that Richard was
deprived of the full use and enjoyment of the property by not being
able to obtain a certificate of title. Under the Motor Vehicle Title and
Registration Law he could legally operate the automobile on the
strength of his application for a certificate of title only while action
95. TENN. CODE ANN.

§47-1213

(2) and (3) (1956).

96. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1269 (1956).
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by the division thereon was pending. 97 He could not validly transfer
the automobile without first procuring a certificate of title to be
issued in his name.98
The decision of the court is illustrative of the effect of the Motor
Vehicle Title and Registration Law on the rights and duties of
vendors and vendees under the Uniform Sales Act. It is in accord
with one prior Tennessee case,99 and cases from other jurisdictions
where the question has been raised, 10 0 placing the responsibility on
the vendor to furnish the vendee with the necessary documents, conforming to the requirements of the title registration law, to obtain a
certificate of title to the automobile.
The case of Standard Stevedoring Co. v. Jaffe' 1 was a suit to
rescind a sale of a motor crane for breach of an express warranty.
The warranty which was alleged to have been breached was that the
crane had a lifting capacity of from fifteen to twenty tons, and was
contained in a trade journal in which the defendant, Jaffe, advertised
the crane for sale.
As a result of this advertisement the complainant sent its agent to
inspect the crane. However, the agent was not an engineer, and no
attempt was made to actually test the lifting capacity of the machine
before it was purchased. The evidence established that the lifting
capacity could not be determined by a visual inspection.
The crane was built and sold by its manufacturer in 1935 with a
manufacturer's rated capacity of five tons. This was unknown to
complainant at the time of inspection and purchase since there were
no identification plates or other markings on the crane. Defendant,
a dealer in second hand, heavy equipment and machinery, purchased
the crane in 1950, completely overhauled it, mounted it on a White
truck and installed a larger motor. These repairs and alterations did
increase to some extent the lifting capacity of the crane, but substantially less than that stated in the advertisement.
The chancellor held that there was a breach of an express warranty concerning the lifting capacity of the crane, and the court of
appeals affirmed.
On the question of whether or not there was an express warranty by
the defendant, the court merely stated that it concurred in the finding
of the chancellor that there was. The facts reported do not indicate
whether the advertisement was the sole basis of the warranty, or
whether the lifting capacity as stated in the advertisement was
97. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-302 (1956).
98. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-319 (1956).
99. White v. Mid-City Motor Co., 39 Tenn. App. 429, 284 S.W.2d 689 (E.S.
1955).
100. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1351 (1958).
101. 302 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
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affirmed by defendant during subsequent negotiations. However, it
is now unquestionable that advertisement of the vendor contained in
a newspaper, magazine, circular or catalogue may be the basis of
an express warranty. 0 2 Nevertheless, the other requisites of an express warranty, (1) that the representations of the vendor must
amount to an affirmation of fact or a promise relating to the goods
03
rather than a mere statement of opinion or of the value of the goods,
and (2) that the vendee rely upon the representations of the vendor
10 4
rather than his own judgment, must also be established.
The only problem of any consequence in the Jaffe case concerning
the existence of an express warranty was whether or not the vendee
relied upon the representation of the vendor as to the lifting capacity
of the crane, or, more specifically, what effect did inspection of the
crane prior to the purchase have upon this question? Even as to this
question the courts generally agree that inspection by the buyer does
not necessarily preclude his reliance on the representations of the
vendor, and where the defect of the goods could not have been discovered by an inspection, he is not so precluded. 0 5 The prior Tennessee cases, as well as the Jaffe case, dispose of the question by holding
that the rule of caveat emptor does not apply in the case of an express
warranty. 10
Retail Sales Tax Act: In Liberty Cash Grocers v. Atkins 0 7 the
Supreme Court of Tennessee interpreted the "isolated sales" exception under the Retail Sales Tax Act' 08 as including a sale by a grocery
chain of store fixtures and automotive equipment to another concern
for use in its business and consequently not subject to the retail sales
tax.
The act declares the legislative intent to be that "every person is
exercising a taxable privilege who engages in the business of selling
tangible personal property at retail . ... "109 A "sale at retail" is defined in part as a "sale to a consumer or to any person for any purpose other than for resale .... ,"0 In the Atkins case the vendee, Na102. See Note, 158 A.L.R. 1413 (1945).

103. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1212 (1956); Wallace v. McCampbell, 178 Tenn.
224, 156 S.W.2d 442 (1941); Madison-Kipp Corp. v. Price Battery Corp., 311
Pa. 22, 166 A. 377 (1933); 46 Am. JuR. Sales § 313, 323 (1943).
104. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1212 (1956); Turner v. Central Hardware Co.,
353 Mo. 1182, 186 S.W.2d 603 (1945); 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 206 (rev. ed. 1948).
105. Bregman Screen & Lumber Co. v. Bechefsky, 16 N.J. Super. 35, 83 A.2d
804 (1951); 77 C.J.S. Sales § 311(b) (1952). See Cresent Cotton Oil Co. v.
Union Gin & Lumber Co., 138 Tenn. 58, 195 S.W. 770 (1917); Sullivan v.
Bandy, 15 Tenn. App. 411 (M.S. 1932).

106. Cresent Cotton Co. v. Union Gin & Lumber Co., 138 Tenn. 58, 195 S.W.
770 (1917); Sullivan v. Bandy, 15 Tenn. App. 411 (M.S. 1932).
107. 304 S.W.2d 633 (Tenn. 1957).

108. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3001 to -3048 (1956).
109. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3003 (1956).
110. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3002(c) (1) (1956).
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tional Tea Company, purchased the goods for use in its business, so
that the sale unquestionably came within the definition of a sale at
retail.
However, since the vendor must be engaged in the business of
selling at retail to be taxed on a sale under this act, the court's decision hinged upon the interpretation of another code section defining
"business," wherein the "isolated sale" exception is found, as follows:
"Business" includes any activity engaged in by any person, or caused
to be engaged in by him, with the object of gain, benefit or advantage,
either direct or indirect. The term "business" shall not be construed
in this chapter to include occasional and isolated sales or transactions by
a person who does not hold himself out as engaged in business.11 1
Although Liberty Cash Grocers was engaged in the retail grocery
business, it was not engaged in the business of selling store fixtures
and automotive equipment, so that the court's decision seems to be a
fair interpretation of the "isolated sales" clause. The decision struck
down an administrative interpretation of the clause by the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation, purporting to tax such sales, on the
ground that "the language of the statute is plain and its meaning obviously different from the administrative construction." 2
111. TENN.CODE ANN.§ 67-3002(j) (1956).
112. 304 S.W.2d at 635.

